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New Concepts of Contract Liabilities in
College Sports: Member Institutions
v. The National Collegiate Athletic
Association
by KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE*
Introduction
Recently, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) has received a great deal of negative publicity regard-
ing its regulation of college sports.1 Many believe that compe-
tition for the ever increasing profit opportunities, in college
sports is the root of the "evil" in the NCAA.2 Unfortunately,
there is growing evidence to support this reasoning. Consider
that a first round appearance in the 1987 NCAA Men's Divi-
sion I Basketball Tournament guaranteed each participating
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Wharton School of the University of
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1. Nearly 30 schools are currently subjected to some NCAA sanction. See 26
Institutions Under NCAA Sanctions, The Chron. of Higher Educ., May 25, 1988, at
A38, col. 1. Among other things, intercollegiate athletics has been said to be "com-
mercialized to the point that it was little more than a big business masquerading as
an educational enterprise." Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's
Death Penalty: How Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 994
(1987).
2. See Smith, supra note 1, at 985, quoting United States Representative
Thomas Luken of Ohio, who stated:
The unhappy fact is that the NCAA is not primarily concerned about kids
who pass through its sports factories. Athletics departments are expected to
be financially self-sustaining, so the profit motive supercedes any concern
for the intellectual development of the athletes. This breeds a corrupting
and destructive drive to win, regardless of the emotional, spiritual or educa-
tional cost to the student. The hope of meaningful reform within the
NCAA is chimera.
Id. (quoting NCAA News, Nov. 3, 1986, at 2, col. 2 (citing N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1986, at
23, col. 1)).
Commercialization is not a recent phenomena. For example, in the mid-1800's
there was a regatta between Harvard and Yale Universities sponsored by a corpora-
tion, with prize money awarded. See Smith, supra note 1, at 988-89.
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NCAA member institution' $239,635. 4 Consider further that
the Big Eight Conference,5 with two conference schools among
the final four teams in that tournament, received $3,834,155.6
The pressure on schools to take extraordinary steps to win,
including "illegal"'7 cash payments to recruit high school sports
stars, is well documented.8  This problem has further mani-
fested itself in the growing concern of NCAA member institu-
tions and conferences over which teams will be selected by the
designated NCAA committees 9 to participate in championship
tournaments.10 In reaction to his school not being selected to
3. Each college or university that is a member of the NCAA is commonly re-
ferred to as a member institution. NCAA CONST. art. IV, § 3(a), NCAA MANUAL
1988-89, at 32-33 (1988).
4. See Gretz, NCAA Shouldn't Tamper With Final Four Success, The NCAA
News, Aug. 17, 1988, at 5 (excerpted from a column in The Kansas City Star). In the
most recent NCAA basketball tournament, the teams reaching the final four were
projected to receive $1.15 million. USA Today, Mar. 14, 1988, § E, at 6.
5. The member institutions are organized into various conferences and most
compete in some manner for their own conference championship.
6. See Tournament Revenue Exceeds Estimate, The NCAA News, July 6, 1988,
at 3. A portion of the earnings from these tournaments are retained by the NCAA
for operating expenses. G. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF AMATEUR SPORTS LAW 3 (1988).
Approximately 90% of 1987 NCAA revenues will come from various championships.
See Executive Committee Approves Record Budget, NCAA News, Sept. 14, 1987, at 1.
7. Although these payments are often referred to as illegal, they are actually
only in violation of NCAA rules, and do not violate the laws of the United States or
most states. See NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1(a), NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 9-10
(1988).
8. See, e.g., Wulff, A Surprise Package, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 25, 1988, at
15 (citing the alleged payment of $1000 to a high school recruit by a University of
Kentucky assistant basketball coach); Sullivan & Neff, Shame on You, SMU, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 9, 1987, at 18 (discussing payments by a booster club member
with the approval of members of the SMU athletic staff to student athletes).
9. The NCAA constitution provides that an appropriate sports committee select
the member institutions for various post season competitions. A designated sports
committee selects a games committee under the guidelines of the NCAA Executive
Regulations. NCAA CONST. art. V, § 8, NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 48-49 (1988). The
selection entity will be referred to hereinafter as the "Selection Committee."
10. See Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 675 F. Supp. 652 (D.D.C. 1987); Kirkpatrick, A
Terrible Omission-Louisville Deserved a Chance to Defend Its Title, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, Mar. 16, 1987, at 74; Carey, New Mexico Disappointed for 2nd Year, USA
Today, Mar. 14, 1988, at El, col. 2; Shuster, Wild, Wild West Voices Its NCAA Com-
plaints, USA Today, Mar. 17, 1988, at C3, col. 1. Louisville head basketball coach,
Denny Crum, whose team was selected in the 1988 tournament, but not in 1987, has
stated that "[ilt doesn't allow the selection to be totally objective because there is so
much subjective input. I think we need to go to a little more computerized system
that involves everything you can put into a computer, then give the committee a
little leeway at the end." USA Today, Mar. 14, 1988, at El, col. 1. The importance of
the revenues has already manifested itself in the NCAA's decision to keep the
NCAA Division I Basketball Tournament field at 64, rather than increasing it as had
been proposed, thereby preventing a further division of tournament revenues. See
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participate in an NCAA championship tournament, the presi-
dent of Howard University brought suit against the NCAA
and said, "This is not a skirmish... [t]his is all-out warfare.""
This university president felt that the NCAA's failure to in-
clude his institution's team in the tournament was inexcus-
able.12 Seemingly, his concern was that, by not being selected
to participate in the championship tournament, his institution
would lose the opportunity to earn thousands of dollars in
revenues.1
3
In the past, both member institutions and student-athletes
have embroiled the NCAA in litigation.14 Most of these ac-
tions have revolved around issues of antitrust and constitu-
tional law.'5 Member institutions have also brought breach of
Sports Industry News, Aug. 26, 1988, at 271. Obviously, limiting the number of par-
ticipants in the fields also maintains the high quality of competition in the tourna-
ment. Id.
11. Howard U. Battles NCAA Over Grid Playoff Snub, JET, Dec. 14, 1987, at 50.
Howard University is an historically black institution located in Washington, D.C.
This comment indicates the dramatic transformation in the perceived value of post-
season play. Jim Hull, captain of the 1939 Ohio State University basketball team,
recalls being invited to the first NCAA basketball tournament: "We didn't want to
go!" he laughed. "We had just won our league title, which was the most important
thing in our minds, and the state high school tournament was being played. We
wanted to watch that tournament. We didn't even know what the N.C.A.A. tourna-
ment was." Schultz, Final Four Makes Sense ... and Dollars, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20,
1988, § 8, at 10, col. 2. The first tournament lost $2,500. Id. See also Howard Univ. v.
NCAA, 675 F. Supp. 652 (D.D.C. 1987).
12. See supra note 11 and infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text (comparing
Howard University's record with those of institutions selected to participate in the
tournament).
13. See supra note 4. In addition to revenues, there is certainly the unqualifiable
benefit of the school being considered "big time."
14. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)
(upholding the plaintiff-university's claim that the NCAA's television policy violated
the Sherman Act); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding the
NCAA's limitation as to the number of assistant coaches which a Division I school
could employ in its football and basketball programs as permissible under antitrust
law); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (invalidating the NCAA's
foreign student rule, under which foreign student athletes were penalized for activi-
ties in which American athletes could freely compete, as an unconstitutional alien-
age classification, id. at 222, but upholding the NCAA's rules regarding eligibility
and minimum grade point average, characterizing the rules as reasonable and per-
missible under the equal protection clause, id. at 221); Trustees of the California
State Universities and Colleges v. NCAA, 82 Cal. App. 3d 461, 147 Cal. Rptr. 187
(1978) (upholding an injunction which prevented the NCAA from imposing sanc-
tions on a university that had followed a common interpretation of a freshman eligi-
bility rule).
15. See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988) (court de-
nied plaintiff's claim that NCAA supension of Southern Methodist University's foot-
ball program for two years violated antitrust law); Association for Intercollegiate
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contract actions against the NCAA, although less frequently.16
In light of the recent expansion of the damages a successful
plaintiff may be awarded in certain breach of contract cases, as
well as the uncertainty of success in any legal action, an exam-
ination of the potential contract actions is useful.'7 This Arti-
Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 577, 584-90 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (AIAW's claim
that the NCAA unlawfully used its monopoly power in men's college sports to facili-
tate its entry into women's college sports and force AIAW out of existence was de-
nied); Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1984) (court refused to uphold
plaintiff's claim that NCAA rule which took away one year of his eligibility without
a formal hearing violated his constitutional right to due process); Wiley v. NCAA,
612 F.2d 473, 477 (10th Cir. 1979) (court dismissed claim that NCAA had violated
plaintiff's rights under the equal protection clause); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028,
1034 (5th Cir. 1975) (court held that NCAA rules governing student eligibility did
not deprive plaintiffs of a liberty or property interest).
16. See, e.g., California State Univ., Hayward v. NCAA, 47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 121
Cal. Rptr. 85 (1975) (University successfully asserts that the NCAA constitution and
bylaws constitute the contract between them). Id at 541, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
17. Obviously, if time permitted, the initial action by a member institution in a
tournament selection case would be for an injunction or other legal action to compel
their admission to the competition. A successful action at this level would negate
the need to pursue further litigation. However, the time between the selection of
the teams and the beginning of the competition is generally quite brief. Howard
University was recently denied temporary injunctive relief despite the merits of its
case because the harm that would come to institutions already selected and others
would be greater than the existing harm to Howard. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 675 F.
Supp. 652, 654-55 (D.D.C. 1987). Thus, even a strong case seeking an injunction may
be unsuccessful. See also infra notes 114-129 and accompanying text.
The uncertainty of success in a legal action is particularly clear in the NCAA anti-
trust and constitutional action. In the antitrust cases, to find collusion, as required
under the Sherman Act, two actors are required. The antitrust actions in sports
always run the risk of a successful "single entity" defense. The selection of tourna-
ment participants may be one activity for which the defense should be valid. A
higher degree of cooperation is obviously necessary to conduct a championship tour-
nament. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984),
which held that the "coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidi-
ary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman
Act." Id. at 771. Thus, a successful argument analogizing the NCAA as the parent
and a member institution as the subsidiary may bar such an action. But cf. NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), where the argument was not successful. See
also infra notes 106-43 and accompanying text (for discussion of the breach of con-
tract theory).
The constitutional actions often require a finding that the NCAA is a "state actor."
Recent cases indicate that such a finding cannot be taken as a given. See, e.g., NCAA
v. Tarkanian, 57 U.S.L.W. 4050 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1988) (holding that the NCAA's partici-
pation in the events that led to the suspension of a state university head basketball
coach for violating NCAA rules did not constitute "state action"), rev'g 741 F.2d
1345; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (holding that a private school's op-
eration is not traditionally an exclusive state function); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d
953, 957-58 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that the NCAA's promulgation and application of
rules do not constitute "state action"); Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir.
1984) (holding that the NCAA's adoption of an eligibility rule was not a "state ac-
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cle will focus on the propriety of a breach of contract action,
and the potential remedies available in the situation where a
member's team has been "wrongfully" excluded from tourna-
ment competition. 8
Potential damage awards for breach of contract may, in cer-
tain circumstances, go beyond compensation for foreseeable
expectation losses.19 Some courts are recognizing that under
unique circumstances, punitive damages may be appropriate.20
Although the guidelines for awarding punitive damages are
not clearly defined, there are three factors that courts may
consider applicable in the NCAA and member institution rela-
tionship.21 First, some courts have held that a party breaching
in "bad faith"22 should be punished and not merely forced to
pay compensatory damages. Apparently, the primary objec-
tive of this measure is to deter bad faith breaches by imposing
substantially greater than traditional economic costs for
breach of contract.23 Second, courts have deemed that where a
fiduciary relationship exists, closer scrutiny of a contract
breach is appropriate.24 Finally, where there is a chance of
"undercompensation" if only compensatory damages are
awarded, punitive damages may be an appropriate vehicle to
redress fully the harm suffered by a plaintiff.
25
The selection of participants for championship tournaments
may, in some instances, be subjective. The decision to invite a
school to tournament competition can be characterized as one
tion"); O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (W.D. Wash.
1988) (holding that the enforcement of the NCAA's drug-testing program was not
under color of state law). Professors Weistart and Lowell note that the majority of
actions brought alleging violations of constitutional due process rights are unsuccess-
ful. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.12, at 184-85 (1979 & Supp.
1985).
18. See infra notes 104-43 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 185-220 and accompanying text.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 185-96 and accompanying text.
23: Id.
24. See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
25. See Sebert, Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages In Actions Based Upon
Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1565, 1647-54 (1986). The discussion in notes 149-84 and accompanying text sets forth
that the standard measure of "expectancy" in contract may well fall short of the
monetary benefits a member institution derives from participating in a champion-
ship tournament. For example, traditional contract damage measures do not account
for the "lost exposure" of the institution to prospective student-athletes, students,
faculty, and benefactors. See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
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of the following: (1) a "good" selection, such as the selection
of a team ranked number one at the time it is chosen to par-
ticipate in a championship tournament;26 (2) a "questionable"
selection-either the nonselection of a team commonly
thought to be a viable participant, or the selection of one com-
monly thought to be nonviable;27 or (3) a "bad faith" selection,
where there is a conscious decision by the Selection Commit-
tee to exclude a member institution that is otherwise clearly
qualified or to include a member institution that is clearly
unqualified.28
Part I of this Article examines the role of the NCAA in col-
lege sports, the fiduciary nature of the NCAA and member
institution relationship, and the development and financial re-
wards of NCAA National Championships. Part II discusses ju-
dicial intervention in NCAA and member institution disputes,
briefly examines some of the litigation initiated by member
institutions against the NCAA, and reviews some of the
problems in the NCAA and member institution relationship.
Part III looks at the appropriateness of applying a contract
analysis to problems in the NCAA and member institution re-
lationship. Part IV identifies how that contract may be
breached and the facts of Howard University v. NCAA. Part
V examines the application of punitive damages to NCAA and
member institution disputes and the likely effect on the
relationship.
This Article focuses on both the "questionable" and "bad
faith" categories of decisions. It concludes that there should
be no judicial intervention when a questionable decision has
been made. However, where there is a bad faith decision,
courts should intervene, grant compensation, and award puni-
tive damages.
26. The selection of number-one-ranked Temple University for the 1987 NCAA
Division I Basketball Tournament is an example of this.
27. See generally supra note 10. See also Weistart, Legal Accountability and the
NCAA, 10 J. C. & U. L. 167, 174 (1983) (noting that "[c]ases in which there are simply
honest differences of opinion are those for which the internal resolutions should
usually be accepted").
28. This is the case that Howard University is asserting. See infra notes 114-133
and accompanying text.
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The NCAA's power and authority has developed over sev-
eral decades. The NCAA has grown from a safety commission
in the early 1900's, to its role today as the country's foremost
controller of intercollegiate athletics.2 9 The Association's de-
velopment began in the late 19th century when the growing
popularity of American football resulted in intercollegiate
competition.30 By the end of the 19th century, college football
was extremely popular,31 but was plagued by violence and the
risk of serious injury.32 Because of these problems and numer-
ous administrative difficulties, college football was viewed by
many to be in a state of disarray.
33
While it was common for colleges to compete against each
other in football, many schools had different standards regard-
ing player eligibility, proper equipment, and even different
rules governing the game.34 Moreover, serious injuries oc-
curred frequently and fatalities were not unknown.35 Despite
excessive violence, rule conflicts, and administrative problems,
college football continued to flourish,36 and initial attempts to
reform the game failed.37
As a result of the efforts of President Theodore Roosevelt,
thirteen schools met in New York on December 9, 1905, to dis-
cuss the abolition of college football.38 The group ultimately
agreed to continue playing the game, but decided to invite
29. See generally Smith, supra note 1, at 993. For a history of the NCAA, see P.
LAWRENCE, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AS-
SOCIATION AND THE BUSINESS OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL (1987); J. FALLA, NCAA: THE
VOICE OF COLLEGE SPORTS (1981); N. HART-NIBBRIG & L. COTTINGHAM, THE POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY OF COLLEGE SPORTS (1986).
30. The "first game" was played between Princeton and Rutgers on November 6,
1869. By today's standards, the game that was played resembled soccer more than it
did rugby or football. J. FALLA, supra note 29, at 6.
31. Id. at 7-9.
32. Id. at 8-9.
33. Id.
34. See P. LAWRENCE, supra note 29, at 7.
35. The 1905 season produced 18 deaths and 149 serious injuries. J. FALLA,
supra note 29, at 13.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 11.
38. P. LAWRENCE, supra note 29, at 7-8; J. FALLA, supra note 29, at 13.
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other schools to join them in making safety reforms.3 9 On De-
cember 28, 1905, sixty-two schools met and formed the Inter-
collegiate Athletic Association of the United States.40 This
Association immediately began to standardize the rules for in-
tercollegiate football.4' These standardized rules outlawed vio-
lent play in the hopes of preventing injury.42
In 1910, the organization was renamed the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association.43 By 1941, the NCAA had grown
to 252 members.44 As membership in the NCAA increased,
there was a corresponding growth in the NCAA's influence
over college sports.45 Rules committees were established for
other intercollegiate sports, including baseball, basketball,
boxing, fencing, golf, gymnastics, ice hockey, lacrosse, soccer,
swimming, tennis, track and field, volleyball, and wrestling.46
In addition to regulating the rules of each sport, the NCAA
began to regulate player eligibility, scheduling, recruiting, and
eventually the administration of national collegiate champion-
ship tournaments.47 Today, the NCAA plays a major role in
the governance of the athletic programs of over 1000 member
institutions.8
As this growth occurred, member institutions began to rely
increasingly on the NCAA to represent their individual inter-
ests. 49 The key to the NCAA's power was, and is today, the
39. J. FALLA, supra note 29, at 14. At this point, Columbia and Northwestern
had suspended play of football, Berkeley and Stanford had substituted rugby for
football, and Harvard's president was threatening the abolition of the game. Id.
40. Id. at 14-15.
41. P. LAWRENCE, supra note 29, at 9-10.
42. Id. at 11. As the Association's membership grew, schools which had been
successful by using excessive violence no longer feared losing a competitive advan-
tage in adopting standardized rules since all opponents had to play under the same
set of rules, thereby further encouraging membership growth. Id.
43. See J. FALLA, supra note 29, at 36.
44. P. LAWRENCE, supra note 29, at 13.
45. Id. at 20-21.
46. Id. at 20. By now, the NCAA had established itself as a "national sports
body." Id. at 15.
47. Id. at 20; J. FALLA, supra note 29, at 176.
48. See Membership In Association Reaches All-Time High (1,020), NCAA News,
Aug. 31, 1988, at 1, col. 3. See also G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, SPORTS
LAW 2 (1986).
49. It should be noted, however, that there is a strong secessionist movement in
the NCAA led by the College Football Association (CFA). The CFA has considered
expanding its role in college sports beyond football to "all intercollegiate athletics."
NCAA News, Oct. 13, 1986, at 4, col. 3. See also Koch, The Economic Realities of
Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND. L.J. 9, 23 (1985).
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revenues from its share of television contracts, championship
tournaments, and its right to impose sanctions on member in-
stitutions that violate NCAA rules.50 The long time Commis-
sioner of the Big Ten Conference, Wayne Duke, stated that
the keys to the success of the NCAA are "enforcement, foot-
ball on television and the [NCAA Division I] basketball
tournament.""1
The fact that many Association-wide contracts are negoti-
ated by NCAA officials causes member institutions to rely on
the negotiating abilities of the NCAA. In this way, individual
schools must rely heavily on the NCAA to aid their schools in
reaping a financial gain from their athletic programs. In
championship tournaments, there is reliance on the NCAA
not only to negotiate the most profitable agreement possible
regarding television and other revenues, but also to select the
proper teams for the tournament.5 2
As in many situations where large amounts of money and
prestige are involved, the process of selecting teams for tour-
nament appearances has been the subject of allegations of bias
and prejudice. Recent litigation has alleged that the selection
process, in some circumstances, may be tainted by the self-in-
terest of Selection Committee members.5 3 Some have even al-
leged that there was a racially discriminatory selection
process.' This Article does not seek to resolve the truth of
these allegations, but merely examines the remedies available
if there are "questionable"55 or "bad faith"56 decisions in the
selection process.
If a college in the United States desires to compete in big
time college sports, the NCAA is the most viable option.
50. See Smith, supra note 1, at 993.
51. See McCallum, In the Kingdom of the Solitary Man, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Oct. 6, 1986, at 70. The 1987-88 Division I Men's Basketball Championship projected
revenues were to account for 81.2% of all NCAA revenues. Executive Committee
Approves Record Budget, NCAA News, Sept. 14, 1987.
52. See infra notes 104-43 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunction at 11, Howard Univ. v. NCAA (No. 87-3206), alleging the selec-
tion committee "imposed irrational, arbitrary and racially discriminatory criteria."
These allegations have been denied by the NCAA. See Defendant NCAA's Memo-
randum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Application for Temporary Restraining Order at
4, Howard Univ. v. NCAA (No. 87-3206).
54. See, e.g., Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunction, supra note 53.
55. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Although a few other entities regulate various sectors of col-
lege sports, none wield the financial power of the NCAA.57
Professor Weistart, a leading sports law scholar, has labeled
the control that the NCAA has over college sports, and there-
fore over the member institutions, as "monolithic. 5 8  This
monolithic power, coupled with the trust placed in the NCAA
by member institutions, creates a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the NCAA and member institutions.59 Weistart also
notes that, in a general sense, when a regulator such as the
NCAA has exclusive control over a process such as tourna-
ment selection, the deliberative qualities of the body may be
affected: "As participants individually have few options, the
organization has reduced incentives for careful deliberation. If
the deliberative process is imperfect, there is an enhanced
probability that its products will have that same characteris-
tic."6 ° One area where this fiduciary trust is placed in the
NCAA is in the conduct of national championship
tournaments.6 1
B. NCAA National Championships
In the closing address of the thirteenth NCAA convention
in 1919, the NCAA president suggested to the convention that
"college athletes of the United States possibly might meet in
competition for the various national championships. 6 2 The
next year, the executive committee of the NCAA met and dis-
cussed the feasibility and benefits of a national championship
competition.63 At the following convention, the president told
the convention that the executive committee had decided to
support a national competition in hopes "that such a national
contest would act as a stimulus to field sports and track events
throughout the whole length and breadth of the land, and by
actual competition determine the national championship. '6 4
57. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 17, at 760.
58. Weistart, supra note 27, at 171.
59. Id. at 173. For a general discussion of fiduciary law see Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983); see also irnfra notes 197-209 and accompanying
text.
60. Weistart, supra note 27, at 172.
61. See NCAA CONST. art. V, § 8, NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 48-49 (1988).
62. Falla indicates that the statement was made by then President Palmer
Pierce "almost as an afterthought." J. FALLA, supra note 29, at 176.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 177.
[Vol. 11: 1
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The first NCAA national championship was held at the Uni-
versity of Chicago in 1921, where sixty-two schools competed
for the track and field championship. 5 Shortly thereafter, the
NCAA began to sponsor championships in other sports.6 To-
day, the NCAA sponsors approximately eighty championships
in more than twenty sports.67
In addition to championship tournaments, there was a
proliferation of postseason football bowl games after World
War 11.68 The NCAA took interest in these bowl games be-
cause of concern over potential or actual improprieties, as well
as concern regarding whether its members were receiving just
compensation for their participation. 9 In 1951, the NCAA
Bowl Game Committee recommended an NCAA constitu-
tional amendment to regulate postseason competition.70 When
the convention voted to adopt the amendment, the NCAA en-
tered a new era. More than being the guardian of the integ-
rity of intercollegiate athletics, it was now regulating bowl
games. More importantly, it was in a position to significantly
affect the revenue flow of its members and itself.
The NCAA took special efforts to insure the existence of
championship competition on all levels. For example, a Na-
tional College Division Basketball Championship was held in
1957 and included teams that normally would not have been
able to compete in postseason play with larger schools.71
Although the Division I Men's Basketball Tournament is the
largest and most profitable championship, the NCAA sponsors
a variety of championships for schools of varying sizes.
72
What the NCAA executive committee either did not realize,
or could not avoid at the time, was that eventually, by select-
65. Id. at 178.
66. Id. at 179-202. The oldest national intercollegiate championship is in tennis,
conducted on grass courts on the grounds of an insane asylum in 1883. Id. at 177.
67. See Bylaws and Interpretations, art. V, § 6, NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 120
(1988) (citing 77 national championships).
68. In 1948, there were 50 postseason bowl games. P. LAWRENCE, supra note 29,
at 90. See also G. WONG, supra note 6, at 6, and College Bowl Schedule, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 21, 1988, at C9, col. 2 for bowl game revenues.
69. P. LAWRENCE, supra note 29, at 89.
70. Id. at 90.
71. Even when a computer was first used to aid in selecting participants for the
NCAA Division I basketball field of 48 teams, Committee Chair Wayne Duke noted,
"We'll still hear from the 49th rated team, I'm sure." J. FALLA, supra note 29, at
188.
72. See supra note 67.
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ing participants for these tournaments, it was stepping into a
favorite American pastime: determining which are the best
teams in a given sport, sometimes without the benefit of head-
to-head competition. The debate becomes even more forceful
when it is time to select the teams to participate in a particu-
lar championship tournament. An issue that might better be
left to the sports bars of America is decided by the administra-




Judicial Intervention in NCAA and Member
Institution Disputes
The actions of the NCAA are governed, in a broad sense, by
the "doctrine of private associations."74 A private association
is frequently defined as a group of individuals who have for-
mally organized to promote a common purpose.75 Historically,
the broad definition of private associations has included un-
ions, political associations, and social clubs. 6 Generally, courts
are reluctant to become involved in the affairs of private as-
sociations,77 and will intervene only when there is a violation
of the association's rules, where other illegality exists, or
when an action is taken by the association in bad faith. 8
This proposition was recently affirmed in Crouch v. Na-
tional Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc.,79 a Second
Circuit opinion involving the National Association for Stock
73. NCAA CONST. art. V, § 8, NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 48-49 (1988).
74. See generally Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76
HARV. L. REV. 983 (1963) [hereinafter Private Associations]. For a thorough discus-
sion of this area of the law as it relates to the NCAA, see Note, Judicial Review of
Disputes Between Athletes and the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 24 STAN.
L. REV. 903 (1972) (authored by Kenneth J. Philpot & John R. Mackall) [hereinafter
Philpot & Mackall]. The authors define a private association as "any group of indi-
viduals who have joined together in some type of formalized structure for the attain-
ment of common purposes ... ." Id. at 909.
75. Private Associations, supra note 74, at 985.
76. Id.
77. See generally id.; J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 17, § 1.14, at 32-44.
See, e.g., California Trial Lawyers Ass'n. v. Superior Ct., 187 Cal. App. 3d 575, 580,
231 Cal. Rptr. 725, 728 (1986) (if a rule is not unreasonable or arbitrary, courts
should exercise judicial restraint).
78. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 17, § 1.14, at 37-38; Philpot & Mackall,
supra note 74, at 911.
79. 845 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Car Auto Racing (NASCAR), another private sports associa-
tion. In Crouch, the primary issue was whether a court should
interfere with a private association's interpretation of its
rules."0 In reviewing the district court opinion, Judge Meskill
stated: "[W]e conclude that the district court should have de-
ferred to NASCAR's interpretation of its own rules in the ab-
sence of an allegation that NASCAR acted in bad faith or in
violation of any local, state or federal laws.
8 1
Judge Meskill analogized the NASCAR situation to Charles
0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,s2 where the same principle was set
forth deeming it inappropriate for a court to interfere in the
affairs of Major League Baseball, a private association, where
no internal rules had been violated, and the league commis-
sioner had not acted in bad faith. 3 In that case, then Oakland
Athletics owner, Charles 0. Finley, challenged the baseball
commissioner's power to disapprove player contract assign-
ments that the commissioner found to be "not in the best in-
terests of baseball." 4 The Court found that the commissioner
acted in good faith by adhering to the association's guidelines
and, therefore, declined to intervene in the matter.8 5 The
court noted that whether the commissioner's action was "right
or wrong" was outside the scope of their power, absent a
showing that the action was "arbitrary or capricious, or moti-
vated by malice, [or] ill will."8 6
NCAA championship tournament participant selections fall
squarely within this bad faith exception. These decisions in-
volving private associations make it clear that, generally, a
court should not attempt to intercede by assessing the merits
of an NCAA selection. Even questionable tournament selec-
tions made by the NCAA should not be reviewed by the
courts. However, consistent with the case law that holds that
court intervention is proper when an association makes a bad
faith decision, courts should be able to intervene when the
NCAA makes a bad faith selection decision. 7
The fact that the selection process is final and that execu-
80. Id. at 400-03.
81. Id. at 403.
82. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
83. Id. at 544.
84. Id. at 532.
85. Id. at 539.
86. Id.
87. Private Associations, supra note 74, at 1002-04.
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tive regulations of the NCAA do not permit an internal appeal
makes judicial intervention even more appropriate in bad faith
situations involving the NCAA.88 Absent the right to appeal
NCAA selection decisions, the appropriate avenue for an ag-
grieved school to plead its case appears to be in the courts.89
Because tournament revenues can constitute a significant
source of income, member institutions may choose to pursue
such an action.9' The case of football broadcast revenues is il-
lustrative of this.
Revenues from football broadcasts have steadily increased
since the 1950's. In 1962, Columbia Broadcasting System
(CBS) paid the NCAA and its members $5.1 million for the
right to televise a series of games.9 By 1968, American Broad-
casting Companies (ABC) was paying $16.7 million per year.92
The last agreement between the NCAA and CBS and ABC
called for the NCAA to receive $264 million in exchange for
the right to broadcast games from 1982-85. 93 At the same time
this agreement was being formed, a group of large schools
which comprised the College Football Association (CFA) was
negotiating a contract with the National Broadcasting Com-
88. The NCAA Executive Regulations state: "At no time will the Executive
Committee or a governing sports committee consider an appeal of a decision of a
governing sports committee, or a subcommittee designated by it, concerning selec-
tion of teams or individuals or their assignment in the championship competition
.... " EXEC. REGS., Reg. 1, § 2(d)(5), NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 192 (1988). The
rationale for this is apparently that there would be constant appeals as well as delays
and disruptions as schools felt compelled to present their cases.
89. See, e.g., Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 675 F. Supp. 652, 654 (1987). The court
denied the restraining order even though it conceded the likelihood of harm to the
university and its team members. Id. at 652.
90. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. An income dispute over television
revenues was the impetus for previous litigation between the NCAA and member
institutions. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). The
advent of television presented new problems for the NCAA and its members. In the
late 1940s, some schools were receiving substantial revenues by unilaterally broad-
casting their home football games. P. LAWRENCE, supra note 29, at 75-76. Interest-
ingly, the overwhelming majority of schools felt that television was the direct cause
of decreased attendance at live games. Id. at 77. As a result, the NCAA Television
Committee was formed in 1950. Id. It recommended a moratorium on the broadcast
of games for 1951 and the development of a policy to limit game broadcasts in the
future. Id. at 75-76. The plan allowed for seven games to be shown over a ten-week
period with broadcasts on Saturday afternoons. A team was limited to two appear-
ances. The proceeds of the sale of the television rights were divided, with 40% going
to the participating schools and 60% going to the NCAA. Id at 78. Throughout the
1950s the NCAA made changes to accommodate regional demand. Id. at 82-86.
91. Id. at 96.
92. Id. at 97.
93. Id. at 103.
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pany (NBC). 94 When the news of the contract was made pub-
lic, several leaders of the NCAA made it clear that any schools
that honored the CFA-NBC contract would be subject to disci-
plinary action.95 The Universities of Georgia and Oklahoma,
both members of the CFA, brought an antitrust lawsuit
against the NCAA. They were successful in showing that
NCAA control over the broadcast of college games violated
the Sherman Act.96 Although the NCAA has been embroiled
in litigation involving issues ranging from athlete eligibility to
the constitutionality of drug testing of student athletes,97 the
decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of
Oklahoma98 was the association's most publicized litigation
defeat.
The effects of the Court's decision have been harsh on the
NCAA. The case showed the vulnerability of the NCAA to
antitrust liability.99 However, the Supreme Court recognized
the need for cooperation between the NCAA and its member
institutions.100 This need for cooperation is often cited as a de-
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). The Sher-
man Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
97. See supra note 14.
98. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
99. See supra note 14.
100. 468 U.S. at 101. This case arose because of the NCAA's limit on the number
of times a college could appear on television. Id. at 94. The broadcasts, or as the
NCAA refers to them, exposures, were divided into three categories: national Divi-
sion II, national Division III, and regional games. Id. at 93. Schools were permitted
to appear on television a maximum of six times over a two-year period. Id. at 94.
Among those exposures, only four games could be broadcast nationally, with the
remainder being only regional broadcasts. Id. The NCAA also had an agreement
with two television networks which gave each the exclusive right to broadcast games
in the network television market. Id. at 91-93. The NCAA also sold broadcast rights
to a cable television broadcaster. Id. at 92 n.9. Furthermore, the NCAA stipulated a
minimum fee schedule by which schools received income for appearing in a broad-
cast. Id. at 92-93. However, the networks themselves had to negotiate with individ-
ual schools to actually broadcast a contest. Id. at 93. The Court noted that the
NCAA's arrangement was similar to other restraints that had been found to be ille-
gal per se: potential competitors had agreed to limit output (in the form of television
broadcasts), and the NCAA had fixed prices by setting a minimum fee schedule
(which in fact was the actual price paid to colleges by the networks). Id. at 99-100.
Nonetheless, the Court chose not to apply a per se analysis to the NCAA's acts but
to examine them under the "Rule of Reason." Id. at 100-04.
The Court stated that for college football to be successful, a certain level of coop-
erative activity was necessary. Id. at 101-02. Therefore, an antitrust inquiry must
include a review of the justifications for the conduct of the accused party. Id. at 103.
See also J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 17, at 122 (1985 Supp.). Weistart and
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fense by sports entities in antitrust actions.1"' This defense to
an antitrust action may make a breach of contract action ap-
propriate when problems arise in the NCAA/member institu-
tion relationship. 1 2
The issue of increasingly lucrative tournament selections is
inviting member institution litigation, just as the increased




The NCAA/Member Institution Contractual
Relationship
The terms of the contract between the NCAA and its mem-
ber institutions are set forth in the constitution and bylaws of
the NCAA.10 4 It is well settled that "[t]he constitution, rules
Lowell argue that the purpose of associations is "to oversee and promote the sport in
question, to ensure the integrity of the events, and to adopt standards to provide the
highest level of on-field competition. These goals necessarily involve collective ac-
tion and definitions" (summarizing NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02;
United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 788 (7th Cir.
1981); Gunter Harz Sports Ass'n v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103,
1107-08 (D. Neb. 1981)).
The Court was unsympathetic to the proffered reasons for the restraints in ques-
tion. 468 U.S. at 103. First, the NCAA argued that the arrangement was in the form
of a joint venture which in fact facilitated the marketing of broadcast rights and was
pro-competitive. Id. at 113. While the Court agreed that the NCAA does play a vital
role in maintaining the integrity of college football, it held that the television plan
failed to add to or maintain a competitive balance. 468 U.S. at 118-19. The Court
noted:
It seems unlikely, for example, that there would have been a greater dispar-
ity between the football prowess of Ohio State University and that of North-
western University in recent years without the NCAA's television plan.
The district court found that the NCAA has been strikingly unsuccessful if
it has indeed attempted to prevent the emergence of a 'power elite' in inter-
collegiate football.
Id. at 118 n.62 (quoting Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1310-11
(1982)).
Given that none of the NCAA's justifications were seen as reasonable by the
Court, the NCAA failed to meet the "heavy burden of establishing an affirmative
defense which competitively justifies [the] apparent deviation from the operations of
a free market." 468 U.S. at 113.
101. See, e.g., id.; United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d
781, 788 (7th Cir. 1981); Gunter Harz Sports Ass'n v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511
F. Supp. 1103, 1115-17 (D. Neb. 1981). See generally supra note 17.
102. See generally supra note 17.
103. See generally supra note 10 and accompanying text.
104. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3; California State Univ., Hayward v. NCAA, 47
Cal. App. 3d 533, 541, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85, 89 (1975).
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and bylaws of an unincorporated association, if they are not
immoral, contrary to public policy or the law of the land, or
unreasonable, constitute a contract between the members
which the court will enforce."'' 0 In California State Univer-
sity, Hayward v. NCAA, a California appellate court main-
tained that this general rule is applicable to the NCAA as
well, stating:
That in relation to this subject, there is no fundamental dis-
tinction between a medical association, a labor union and a
fraternal or beneficial association. In each type of organiza-
tion the relationship between the members and the group is
determined by contract, the terms of which find expression in
the constitution and by-laws. Likewise, there can be no fun-
damental distinction between an athletic association and the
above associations where, as here, the claim is that the associ-
ation failed to abide by its own rules or the laws of the
land.10
6
The NCAA's championship tournament selection rules re-
quire that the selection of participants include the best eligible
teams10 7 and avoid any conflict of interest. 0 8 A violation of
these provisions is arguably a breach of contract.'0 9
IV
Breach of Contract
A breach of contract occurs where there is "[a]ny failure to
perform a contractual duty which has arisen."1 0 In California
State University, Hayward v. NCAA, the court observed that
the relationship between an athletic association and its mem-
105. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations & Clubs § 8, at 435 (1963).
106. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (citations omitted) (quoting Bern-
stein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 253, 293 P.2d 862,
869 (1956)). The action here was for an injunction against the NCAA's action declar-
ing California State University, Hayward (CSUH) ineligible for post season play. A
preliminary injunction was found to be appropriate because the NCAA action af-
fected members of CSUH that had not violated the NCAA rule which triggered the
sanction. Id. at 544, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 91. For a discussion of this case see Dickerson
& Chapman, Contract Law, Due Process, and the NCAA, 5 J. C. & U. L. 107, 111-16
(1978). It is very unlikely that either party would challenge the existence of a con-
tractual relationship. The denial of the existence of a contract has been cited as
grounds for awarding punitive damages. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
107. See NCAA EXEC. REGS. Reg. 1, § 5(g), NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 203 (1988).
108. NCAA EXEC. REGS. Reg. 1, § 5(i), NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 203 (1988).
109. See irfra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
110. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12-1, at 513 (3d ed.
1987).
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bers is determined by contract, the terms of which find ex-
pression in the constitution and bylaws.'1 '
One of the terms in the NCAA/member institution contract
is the duty to conduct championship tournaments." 2 The bur-
den to conduct these tournaments fairly is contractually
placed on the NCAA." 31 This duty includes the selection of
tournament participants. Failure to properly perform this
contractual duty may constitute a breach.
A. Howard University v. NCAA
One NCAA member institution, Howard University (How-
ard), brought suit when it was not selected to participate in
the 1987 Division I-AA Football Championships." 4 Howard
alleged that the NCAA's failure to select it as a tournament
participant constituted a breach of contract and a tortious
breach of good faith."5
Howard, as an NCAA member institution, viewed its partici-
pation in all of its scheduled contests as a member in good
standing of the Mid East Athletic Conference (MEAC), as per-
formance of its part of the NCAA/member institution con-
tract. Howard finished the season as champion of the MEAC,
a conference that does not receive an automatic play-off bid." 6
Consequently, every year the MEAC champion must compete
for an at-large bid to the play-offs." 7 The NCAA Division I-
AA Football Championship participants are chosen by the
NCAA tournament Selection Committee. The Selection
Committee chooses the sixteen most qualified teams according
to availability, eligibility, and difficulty of their schedules." 8
Howard expected to be selected to participate in the tourna-
ment." 9 In the final week of the 1987 season, both Howard
111. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 541. See also NCAA CONST. art. V, § 8, NCAA MANUAL
1988-89, at 48-49 (1988).
112. NCAA CONST. art. III, art. V, § 8, NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 7-8, 48-49
(1988).
113. Id.
114. Howard University v. NCAA, 675 F. Supp. 652 (D.D.C. 1987).
115. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and
Damages at 16, Howard University v. NCAA, 675 F. Supp. 652 (D.D.C. 1987).
116. 675 F. Supp at 653.
117. Id.
118. NCAA EXEC. REGS. Reg. 1, § 5(g), NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 203 (1988).
119. 675 F. Supp at 654. In addition, a number of commentators were dismayed at
the omission. See, e.g., Boswell, Howard's Case Against NCAA Full of Merit, Wash.
Post, Nov. 27, 1987, at D1, col. 1; Kornheiser, Howard Is Run Down by Committee,
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and North Texas State were ranked twentieth in Division I-
AA.120 Howard played the team ranked number fourteen in
the NCAA poll, Delaware State, and defeated them by five
points. In contrast, North' Texas State defeated an unranked
team with a losing record by the same five point margin.
121
Judge John Garrett Penn of the United States District Court
stated: "Logic would seem to suggest that under those facts, no
matter how North Texas State and Howard were ranked the
following day, Howard would have the higher ranking.1 122 In-
stead, the Selection Committee cited the relatively weak
strength of the opponents Howard faced during the season and
chose North Texas State to fill the final tournament spot.
123
The Selection Committee later stated that NCAA rankings
were not necessarily accurate. The Selection Committee
pointed out that Delaware State, which had been ranked as
high as seventh in the nation during the 1987-88 season, had
been undeserving of such an inflated ranking. 24 The NCAA
asserted that the ranking of Delaware State as fourteenth in
the final week of the season represented a compromise so that
Delaware State would not drop out of the top twenty.1
25
Howard initially sought a temporary restraining order bar-
ring the championships from taking place until their case
could be heard on the merits. 26 The temporary restraining or-
der was denied, largely because of the adverse effect such a
ruling would have had on the institutions that had already
been selected to participate in the tournament. 27 The court
was influenced by the fact that the competition schedule had
been planned for over a year, a television contract had been
negotiated and signed with the Entertainment and Sports Pro-
gramming Network (ESPN), fans and supporters had already
made their travel arrangements, and many concession opera-
tors were economically dependent on the tournament taking
place on the scheduled date. 2 ' The court noted that, due to
Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1987, at El, col. 1; Milloy, Murder by Selection Committee,
Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1987, at B3, col. 4.
120. 675 F. Supp at 653.
121. Id.




126. Id. at 652. See also supra note 17.
127. 675 F. Supp. at 655.
128. Id.
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these factors, the "public interest" was best served by allowing
the games to take place as scheduled.'29
Although Howard was unsuccessful in its actions to delay or
reorganize the championship tournament, 3 0 the court did note
that Howard's case had merit.'13  Judge Penn stated that
"based on the present record, there was a question as to
whether the defendants followed their own regulations and
the 1987 Football Handbook."'3 2 The 1987 Handbook states
that the only criteria to be followed by a championship tourna-
ment Selection Committee are a school's "won-lost record,
strength of schedule and eligibility and availability of student
athletes for NCAA post-season competition.'
3 3
B. Allegations by Other Member Institutions and Conferences
The Howard incident is not an isolated one, although it is
unique since legal action was actually taken. Another illustra-
tion of a member institution's concern over the selection pro-
cess was the recent complaint by Stanford University
(Stanford) and the Pacific-10 Conference (Pac-10) Commis-
sioner concerning the NCAA's failure to select Stanford to
participate in the 1988 Division I Men's NCAA Basketball
Tournament. 3 1 Stanford, a member of the Pac-10 confer-
ence, 1 5 was not invited to the NCAA tournament, even
though it had defeated the University of Arizona, a highly
ranked team later invited to the tournament.3 6
In 1987, commentators expressed dismay at the omission of
the 1986 NCAA champion, Louisville, from the NCAA basket-
ball tournament.3 7 Louisville felt that the Selection Commit-
tee did not invite them because its conference, the Metro
Conference, allowed a school to participate in the conference
championship tournament, even though the school was on
NCAA probation. 38 Though Louisville was invited the follow-
ing year, Coach Denny Crum continued his "crusade" to re-
129. Id.
130. See supra note 17.
131. 675 F. Supp. at 654.
132. Id.
133. NCAA EXEC. REGS. Reg. 1, § 5(g), NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 203 (1988).
134. See Shuster, supra note 10.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 10.
138. Id.
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form what he labelled a "subjective" selection process.139
The University of New Mexico also expressed dismay at its
non-selection to the basketball tournament after two succes-
sive twenty-win seasons.140 The team was invited to partici-
pate in the National Invitation Tournament (NIT), but the
New Mexico coach indicated that he preferred not to go to
what is generally considered a less prestigious tournament.
1 41
The pending Howard case, the increasing number of com-
plaints, and the potential revenues from tournament appear-
ances indicate that the time may be ripe for an expansion of
breach of contract remedies to include punitive damages. If
there is an abuse of discretion, the member institutions
harmed may have no other route for redriess. 1 42 As the next
section will discuss, any remedy beyond compensation would
be extraordinary. 143  However, the damage that would be
caused by a bad faith decision in the NCAA/member institu-
tion relationship may make such an award appropriate.
V
Damages
Courts generally award only compensatory damages for a
breach of contract.1 4 4 It is necessary to prove that the damages
sought are foreseeable and can be identified with certainty.
145
However, if a bad faith breach of contract occurs, if the con-
tract is between fiduciaries, or if there is a chance of un-
dercompensation, the court may consider an expanded range
of damage awards. 46 As has been noted, there should be no
judicial intervention in a tournament selection decision unless
139. See Room for Improvement, USA Today, Mar. 14, 1988, at El, col. 1.
140. See Carey, supra note 10.
141. Id. However, after meeting with the school's athletic director, Coach Gary
Colson decided to accept the invitation to the NIT. Id.
142. See supra notes 88 and 89 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338
(3d ed. 1968): "The general purpose of the law is, and should be, to give compensa-
tion, that is, to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in had
the defendant kept his contract." See also 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 992
(1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 comment a (1981).
144. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932); 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 143,
§ 1077, at 438. For a history of the rule limiting awards to compensation, see Ellis,
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-20
(1982).
145. See infra notes 149-84 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 185-220 and accompanying text.
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the decision was made in bad faith or was otherwise illegal. 47
Since the NCAA may owe a fiduciary duty to its member in-
stitutions and because wrongful exclusion of a school from a
championship tournament cannot be adequately compensated
by traditional damage measures, the possibility of awarding
punitive damages should be considered.
148
A. Traditional Measure and Limitations
The law has long maintained that the remedy for a contract
breach is compensation. 149 The compensation is equal to the
injured party's expectation at the time the party entered into
the agreement.150 Damages beyond compensation traditionally
have been reserved primarily for tortious acts. 1 ' In fact, the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts maintains that punitive
damages for a breach of contract may be awarded only if
"[t]he conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which
punitive damages are rewardable." '52 The strongest support-
ers of the "compensation only" rule have been law and eco-
nomics scholars.153 They maintain that the decision to breach
a contract is an economic one, and that the breaching party
has complete knowledge of the cost of his or her actions.
Thus, all contract decisions are made with nearly complete in-
formation. Awarding damages beyond compensation would
remove a party's option of making an economic decision to
either fulfill the obligations under a contract or to exercise an
alternative option with knowledge of the fixed cost of the
breach. Thus, a party's decision of whether or not to fulfill
147. See supra note 78.
148. To emphasize the point, there should be no judicial review unless elements
of bad faith are present. Thus, anytime there is a judicial review of a tournament
selection, punitive damages may be appropriate.
149. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
150. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 839 (1982).
151. Id. at 842-43.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). Along these same
lines, punishment is generally deemed not to be appropriate in contract actions, and
clearly damages beyond compensation may be interpreted as punishment. See, e.g., 5
A. CORBIN, supra note 143, § 1077.
153. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93-95, 105-15 (3d ed. 1986);
Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U.
COLO. L. REV. 683 (1986). For specific criticism of the expansion of punitive damages
into the commercial realm see Note, Tort Remedies For Breach of Contract: The
Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Deal-
ing Into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 402-06 (1986) (authored by
Randy E. Barnett).
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contractual obligations would necessarily be made with less
than perfect information. The theory of "efficient breach"
maintains that a party will breach only when there would be
an efficient reallocation of resources."' The prevailing view
among this school of thought is that when there is an efficient
reallocation of resources, society as a whole benefits.
155
The "punishment" inflicted by punitive damages tradition-
ally is reserved for actions in tort.156 In contrast with tort law,
the law of contracts maintains that there is "no necessity for
satisfying... feelings and allaying community resentment by
fines or physical punishment. '157 Thus, punishment does not
traditionally play a role in contract breaches, and damages are
limited to the expectation interest under the contract.
58
Under this traditional measure of contract damages, a member
institution may be prevented from recovering the full extent
of its damages in a tournament selection action.
5 9 The factors
which generally limit what a party may recover in a breach of
contract action are the rules of foreseeability and certainty.
The foreseeability limitation on damages for breach of con-
tract bars recovery by the plaintiff for damages that were not
foreseeable at the time the contract was entered into.
160 This
limitation is directed primarily at the problem of excessive
damages.' 6 ' A leading contracts scholar, Professor Farns-
worth, explains that there are four elements examined in de-
termining the foreseeability of damages.'
62 First, it must be
foreseeable that the loss would occur if the contract is
breached.16  Second, the party that breached must have been
able to foresee the damages. 64 Third, reasonably foreseeable
consequences are adequate; thus, damages are not limited to
154. Sebert, supra note 25, at 1572. This is referred to in economic terms as a
"pareto-superior" allocation of resources. Id.
155. Id. at 1572-73.
156. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932); 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 143,
§ 1077, at 438. See also Sebert, supra note 25, at 1600 n.122.
157. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 143, § 1077, at 438.
158. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 210-220 and accompanying text.
160. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); E. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 150, § 12.14, at 873 (discussing "unforeseeability" as a limitation).
161. See, e.g., Note, Lost Profits As Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and
Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 998 (1956).
162. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 150, § 12.14, at 876-77.
163. Id. at 876.
164. Id. at 877.
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the consequences the defendant actually did foresee. 165 Fi-
nally, the probability that the loss would occur, as opposed to
an absolute certainty, is sufficient. 16
The relevant issue here is what damages are foreseeable in
this tournament selection process. By focusing on Professor
Farnsworth's elements, we find that many damages which
may be suffered by a member institution are not foreseeable.
Some examples include lost future revenues the school would
have earned from the additional exposure to student athletes,
students, potential contributors, and others.167 Thus, the pri-
mary limitation on a traditional contract damages award is de-
termining which types of damages are reasonably foreseeable
and which are not.
Another limitation on damages that may be awarded for a
contract breach is certainty.'68 The certainty doctrine origi-
nally required that damages "be shown by clear and satisfac-
tory evidence, to have been actually sustained" and "be shown
with certainty, and not left to speculation or conjecture."' 69
Hence, the certainty limitation is primarily one of proof.170
Although this certainty requirement continues to exist, it has
been reduced over the years to a requirement of only "reason-
able certainty.' 7 1 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
notes that while extremely disproportionate damages may be
limited because they were deemed to be unforeseeable,
"[s]ometimes these limits are covertly imposed, by means of an
especially demanding requirement .. .of certainty.' 72
Professor Farnsworth indicates that when the breach is
"willful," the certainty requirement, or at least the proof of
specific damages, is not as rigid. 73 There are some cases illus-
trating a relaxation of the certainty requirement. For exam-
ple, in Rombola v. Cosindas,174 the court held that a horse
trainer could attempt to prove lost profits based on races a
165. Id.
166. Id. at 876.
167. See infra notes 210-20 and accompanying text.
168. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 150, § 12.15, at 881.
169. Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491 (1858).
170. Id.
171. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 150, at 882.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 comment f (1981).
173. Id.
174. 351 Mass. 382, 220 N.E.2d 919 (1966) (The court allowed an expert witness to
present evidence to approximate the horse's future earnings based on its past earn-
ings. Id. at 384).
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horse would have run.
175
If a jury does not determine damages with certainty in a
breach of contract action, that jury's verdict may be set
aside.176 Awards of damages "must be certain, both in their
nature and in respect to the cause from which they
proceed.'
'1 77
The certainty issue often arises in questions of lost profits. 7
The question of lost profits affects what damages may be
awarded to a member institution excluded from a champion-
ship tournament. Courts have identified lost profits from a
sporting event as generally not certain enough to recover. 9
For example, in Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey,8 0 the
profits sought by the promoter of a fight were deemed to be
too speculative.' 8 '
Under the traditional damage measure, the only lost profits
that can be identified with certainty in a tournament selection
action are the revenues awarded to a first round participant in
any given tournament. A member institution wrongly denied
participation in the NCAA Division I Basketball Tournament
might be awarded the guaranteed first round sum of
$239,635,182 but foreseeability and certainty limitations would
prevent a court from guessing how far a team would have
progressed in that tournament had it participated.8 3 Further,
it is unlikely that a court would give a great deal of weight to
evidence, from experts or otherwise, on how far it might have
175. Id.
176. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-8, at 599 (1987).
177. Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 495 (1858); see also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 176, § 14-8, at 599-600.
178. See also A. CORBIN, supra note 143, §§ 1020-28 comment c; Comment, Reme-
dies-Lost Profits as Contract Damages for an Unestablished Business: The New
Business Rule Becomes Outdated, 56 N.C.L. REV. 693 (1978); Evergreen Amusement
Corp. v. Milstead, 206 Md. 610, 618, 112 A.2d 901, 904 (1955).
179. Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932); Carnera v.
Schmelling, 236 A.D. 460, 260 N.Y.S. 82 (1932).
180. 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932).
181. Id. at 550. However, a number of state courts are now recognizing that the
issue of lost profits should be viewed as an evidentiary matter and base their deci-
sions on whether there is enough evidence to show that the profits would have actu-
ally been earned if the contract had not been breached. See, e.g., Pauline's Chicken
Villa, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 701 S.W.2d 399 (1985); Kenford Co. v.
Erie County, 108 A.D.2d 132, 489 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1985), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 493 N.E.2d
234, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1986).
182. See supra note 4.
183. The process is certainly more speculative than forecasting the profits a busi-
ness would have made. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 150.
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progressed in a given championship."' Thus, the traditional
law would bar a recovery in excess of first round revenues.
However, for several reasons, such an award may be se-
verely inadequate to compensate an injured member institu-
tion. The revenues for participating in the tournaments are
just a small part of the revenue that these institutions may
expect to receive from the increased visibility of playing in a
championship tournament. Where the NCAA makes a deci-
sion barring an institution from a championship tournament,
one needs to consider what is at stake. Clearly, large quantifi-
able television and ticket revenues are lost, but additional con-
sequential damages are also incurred. Calculating such
damages, however real, presents a problem under existing con-
tract theories. As a result of conventional ideas of contract
damages, a member institution which is not selected to a tour-
nament is unlikely to recoup all losses suffered due to the
NCAA's breach of the NCAA/member institution contract.
B. Punitive Damages
The bad faith nature of a breach, the fiduciary relationship
of the member institution and the NCAA, and the potential
for undercompensation may make an award of punitive dam-
ages appropriate for a breach of contract by the NCAA. But,
as discussed below, the strongest justification is the possibility
of gross undercompensation under traditional damage compu-
tation.
1. Bad Faith
Generally, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing re-
quires that each party to a contract (1) substantially perform
contractual obligations, and (2) avoid undermining the rights
of the other party to enjoy the benefits of the contract.8 5 A
bad faith breach occurs when either prong of this covenant is
violated. Good faith in the NCAA/member institution rela-
tionship requires adherence to their contract, set forth in their
184. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 150.
185. See, e.g., Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform
in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 379, 384 n.65 (1980); U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987); Sea-
man's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768, 686 P.2d 1158,
1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984); San Jose Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Old Republic Life
Ins. Co., 723 F.2d 700, 703 (9th Cir. 1984).
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constitution and bylaws.1
8 6
The concept of bad faith breach has been most widely
promulgated in insurance cases. The failure of an insurance
company to pay the claim of an insured, or even to pay in a
timely manner, has been held to constitute a bad faith breach
and to allow the plaintiff to recover punitive damages.
8 7 The
relationship of the parties, especially the unequal bargaining
power at the formation of the contract, is one reason for such
a result. 88
In some jurisdictions this cause of action has expanded be-
yond the insurance context. 8 9 A leading case for the proposi-
tion of expanding punitive damages to contract breaches
outside the insurance industry is Seaman's Direct Buying
Serv. v. Standard Oil Co."9 ° The case involved a contract dis-
pute between Standard Oil and a ship fuel supply dealer. Sea-
man's brought this successful action when Standard Oil
attempted to deny the existence of a contract between them.'
9 '
The California Supreme Court affirmed the proposition that
there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
every contract that neither party will do anything which will
injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement. 192 The court recognized that punitive damages for
bad faith contract breaches may be available due to the special
relationship that exists between insurance companies and the
insured. 93 The court further noted, however, that in cases
with "similar characteristics," punitive damages may be avail-
able as well. Although the court did not state specifically
what these "similar characteristics" might be, it did cite "fidu-
ciary responsibility" as a possible element.
94
A major reason that punitive damages have been allowed
186. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 (1982); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d
173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1967).
188. The fact that colleges have little choice but to join the NCAA if they desire
to participate in major college sports illustrates the unequal bargaining power at the
formation of the contract. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686
P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
192. Id. at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
193. Id. at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
194. Id. at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
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for bad faith contract breaches is their deterrent effect. 9 ' The
general feeling is that individuals or entities will consider the
potential economic harm to themselves before they violate the
law. The theory is that the increased economic harm for bad
faith will deter such breaches.196 Applying this analysis to the
tournament selection scenario, the possibility of punitive dam-
ages should compel the selection committees to make sure
that their selection decisions are fair.
2. Fiduciary Breach of Contract
As the discussion in part I noted, there is much to indicate
that the NCAA/member institution relationship is a fiduciary
one.'97 A fiduciary is defined as "a person holding the charac-
ter of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee,
in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the
scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires.' 98 Two
specific sources of the fiduciary relationship between the
NCAA and its member institutions are the NCAA constitution
and bylaws. The bylaws state that member institutions agree
to abide by the rules; the NCAA, among other things, agrees
to conduct national championship tournaments "among the
best eligible ... teams .. ."I99 Thus, the member institutions
place their trust in the NCAA to select championship tourna-
ment participants.
In professional sports, courts have found that the relation-
ship between the individual franchises and the professional
league, the counterparts of the member institutions and the
NCAA, are close enough to be fiduciary in nature. In Profes-
sional Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass'n 200 the court ruled
that the member franchises involved owed each other fiduci-
195. See generally Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
196. An obvious problem in applying this deterrence justification to an NCAA
breach is that the bad faith action may be by individual committee members who do
not directly feel the economic harm to the entity as they would if it were a penalty
assessed against them individually. However, the threat of such a penalty should
have some incremental effect on the individual committee members. See, e.g., Metz-
ger, Organizations and the Law, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 407 (1987); C. STONE, WHERE THE
LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975).
197. See, e.g., Palmer v. Fuqua, 641 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Coates, 253
F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
198. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (5th ed. 1979)
199. See NCAA EXEC. REGS. Reg. 1, § 2(a), NCAA MANUAL 1988-89, at 191 (1988).
200. 143 Cal. App. 3d 410, 191 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1983).
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ary duties.20 1 The California Court of Appeals stated that
"there is a duty of loyalty which requires directors-trustees
not to act in their own self-interest when the interests of the
corporation will be damaged thereby. ' 20 2  This same rule
against self interest appears to be applicable in the tourna-
ment selection process.
This interdependence gives further strength to a finding
that the NCAA member institution relationship is fiduciary in
nature. One commentator noted:
An examination of the jurisprudential origins of fiduciary ob-
ligations is particularly instructive.
Why do fiduciary duties arise in brokers, corporate direc-
tors, lawyers and others? Is the duty essentially contractual:
the putative fiduciary promised to do the job and hence must
do it right? I think not. A more consistent theory is that the
fiduciary duty arises because of the fact of the beneficiary's
dependency, or conversely, the fiduciary's extraordinary con-
trol .... As the former's dominance can be used for good or
ill, a principle is needed to insure that in instances in which
the proper course of action is otherwise uncertain, the fiduci-
ary will show appropriate responsibility.20 3
Outside the sports context, there is precedent to support the
contention that breach of contract between fiduciaries is
proper grounds for awarding punitive damages. These cases
involve real estate brokers, partners, and trustees.20 4  The
Fifth Circuit case of Palmer v. Fuqua20 5 involved an action
brought by members of a partnership against one of the part-
ners for the taking of a partnership opportunity. The limited
partners claimed that the general partner had taken property
for his individual use without offering the opportunity to the
partnership first.2 6  The court found that the partner
breached his fiduciary duty in taking the partnership property.
201. Id. at 415, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
202. Id. The case involved an approval of a sale by the World Hockey Association
Board of Trustees.
203. Weistart, supra note 27, at 173.
204. See, e.g., Palmer v. Fuqua, 641 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (general partner
breaches fiduciary duty to partnership); Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(real estate agent breaches fiduciary duty); Youngblood v. Mock, 143 Ga. App. 320,
238 S.E.2d 250 (1977) (agent selling equipment converts equipment to own use);
Kirby v. Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161 (1985) (punitive damages awarded for breach of fidu-
ciary duties to other members of joint property venture).
205. 641 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981).
206. Id. at 1152.
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Based on the breach of fiduciary duty, the court held that
awarding punitive damages against the general partner was
proper. °7
The court in Palmer v. Fuqua applied Texas law, which rec-
ognized a cause of action for punitive damages for breach of
contract in certain instances, including those which involve a
breach of fiduciary duty.20 8 Thus, when a partner breaches a
contract, he or she also breaches a fiduciary duty. Again, the
relationship of the parties is the important factor.20 9 Although
the NCAA and member institutions are not partners, it does
appear that their relationship is fiduciary in nature and that a
similar decision in a bad faith tournament selection case would
be appropriate.
The deterrence of bad faith decisions alone may not be
enough to justify punitive damages in the NCAA/member in-
stitution relationship. However, if deterrence is joined by the
potential for undercompensation, there is an even greater jus-
tification for a punitive damage award.
3. Undercompensation
Commentators have illustrated that in many classic com-
mercial contract cases the plaintiff is undercompensated by
the traditional contract remedy awarded.210 The reason gener-
ally cited for this undercompensation is the law's determina-
tion to award only those damages which were foreseeable and
identifiable with certainty at the time the contract was
formed.211 The undercompensations most often cited by com-
mentators are the general costs of litigation, attorneys' fees,
and prejudgment interest.21 2
207. Id. at 1161.
208. Id. at 1160-61.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Sebert, supra note 25, at 1573-84; Farber, Reassessing the Economic
Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443,
1444-45 (1980). Professor Sebert argues strongly that undercompensation may have
as negative an effect as overcompensation (overcompensation being part of the eco-
nomic argument against punitive damages). His view relates to the ability to make
economic decisions to breach in the commercial context. Sebert, supra note 25, at
1573. But c.f, Note, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing as Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1291, 1296 (1985) (asserting that "[tiort
damages already remedy the inadequate compensation deterrence of contract
damages").
211. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
212. See Sebert, supra note 25, at 1578.
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In the context of a member institution not selected to par-
ticipate in a tournament, it is possible only to a limited degree
to calculate the school's prospective share of television and
ticket revenues.213 Obviously, the financial rewards to a mem-
ber institution eliminated in the first round are less than that
for a school that is a tournament champion. A court would
probably be reluctant to award to a school anything beyond
the shares paid to schools that lose in the first round, or at
best the average for all tournament participants. Either
amount would probably fall short of the financial benefits a
championship tournament participant actually receives.
Coupled with this problem of forecasting the success of a
school in a championship tournament are a number of other
potential income opportunities for member institutions. When
Temple University competed in the 1988 NCAA basketball
tournament, they reportedly experienced a fifty percent in-
crease in campus visits and a thirty-three percent increase in
admissions applications over the previous year.214 Temple also
anticipated souvenir sales to total $500,000.215 There is no
traditional legal basis for a university to recover the financial
losses for these items because they cannot be identified with
certainty. No damages could be awarded for the lost exposure
to alumni who might have been encouraged to make contribu-
tions to the school due to its participation in the playoffs.
21 6
213." In addition to the problem of knowing how far a team would have advanced
against the competition, the level of income the school would have earned from
ticket sales and fees paid by advertisers may fluctuate based on the schools that are
involved. For example, a school from a major media market such as Los Angeles or
New York would probably attract more viewers, fans, and potential consumers than
a school from a different market.
214. Sports Industry News, Apr. 1, 1988, at 102.
215. Id.
216. There is evidence pointing in both directions as to whether contributions to
an institution increase due to superior athletic performance. Studies concentrate
either on the effect on contributions to the athletic program, or to the university
generally. See generally Bergman, Do Sports Make Money for the University, FOOT-
NOTES (Spring 1988) (discussing the general assumption that contributions increase);
Do Winning Teams Spur Contributions? Scholars and Fund Raisers Are Skeptical,
The Chron. of Higher Educ., Jan. 13, 1988, at 32-34, col. 1 (discussing several studies
that have been done and asserting that anecdotes regarding increased contributions
may well be exceptions); Gifts, Applications Rise at Witchita State After Its Losing
Football Team Is Dropped, The Chron. of Higher Educ., Jan. 13, 1988, at 33, col. 1
(reporting that enrollment increased by 200 students and contributions jumped from
$13.5 million to $25.5 million once the football program was dropped); Krupa, Profit-
ing From Losses, SPORTS INC., Aug. 29, 1988, at 32 (noting that Columbia University
alumni donations to the athletic program have increased "[d]espite, or perhaps be-
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Recruitment of prospective student athletes may be affected
as well.217 Temple star basketball player, Mark Macon, stated
that he learned of Temple's program by watching the school
on television in the previous year's tournament.218 Further-
more, individual team members lose the opportunity to attract
the attention of professional scouts. It may be that an im-
proved level of performance or a strong performance against
strong competition sparks a professional team's interest in a
student athlete. Member institutions suffer, as well as the stu-
dent athlete, if this occurs, since the school loses the benefits
their former students' professional careers could bring, such as
the increased level of exposure and the unquantifiable value
of being considered "big time."
Although difficult to quantify, the monetary losses involved
in losing an opportunity to compete in an NCAA champion-
ship tournament are obviously very large. 21 9 A certainty or
foreseeability defense would probably bar recovery of most of
these items under traditional damage rules.22 ° Punitive dam-
ages, however, would provide the plaintiff member institution
with some compensation for these additional damages. These
damages would not be available unless the action by the
NCAA was proven to be in bad faith. Clearly, the value of
added tuition, notoriety, and recruitment of a key student-ath-
lete cannot be quantified. However, awarding punitive dam-
ages would help to compensate the member institution for
those losses.
Conclusion
Courts should continue to stay out of the affairs of private
cause of, its [41 game] losing streak"). For specific studies see, e.g., Coughlin & Er-
ekson, Contributions to Intercollegiate Athletic Programs: Further Evidence, 66 Soc.
Sci. Q. 194 (March 1985) (concluding that football success increases contributions but
that football attendance is an even more "powerful" variable, id. at 202); Sigelman &
Bookheimer, Is It Whether You Win or Lose? Monetary Contributions to Big-Time
College Athletic Programs, 64 Soc. Sci. Q. 347 (June 1983).
217. See George, Chaney's Playbook: His Life, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1988, at C1,
col. 1.
218. Id.
219. In addition to the clearly-defined revenues, recruitment, and other monetary
benefits, see Rhodes, Wildcats Put Their School on the Map, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1,
1988, B9, col. 1 (noting that a significant benefit to the University of Arizona as a
result of participating in the NCAA tournament was the public finally distinguishing
their institution from nearby Arizona State University).
220. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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associations except in the case of illegal or bad faith actions.
The possibility of intervention alone should assure closer ad-
herence to a given organization's constitution and bylaws. The
possibility of intervention can only serve to maintain a level of
integrity in the governance of college sports. Without the pos-
sibility of intervention by courts, member institutions who
have been harmed by the NCAA would not be able to obtain
recourse in private law areas such as contracts.
It is difficult in any contract situation to prevent contracting
parties from acting in bad faith. However difficult it may be to
impose such standards on an individual, it is even more diffi-
cult to change the behavior of an organization such as the
NCAA. Although the concept that the behavior of an organi-
zation is difficult to control would somewhat negate the deter-
rent justification for punitive damages, it has no bearing on
the undercompensation theory. Even so, the deterrent effect
of such an award cannot be completely discounted. If the
availability of punitive damages deters one bad faith decision,
that is a clear improvement over the state of governance in
college sports today. This dual effect of deterrence and ade-
quate compensation would seem to justify an award of puni-
tive damages in this type of contract breach.
The problems challenging the NCAA are complex. The ex-
clusion of a member institution from a revenue producing
tournament is but one of the many issues that confront this
college sports governing body.221 The contract law analysis ex-
amined in this Article may be appropriate, as well, for other
NCAA actions negatively affecting member institutions and
student-athletes .
222
221. See, e.g., supra note 14.
222. See, e.g., supra note 17.

